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I. Introduction
The global War on Terror has changed.' "State sponsorship of terrorism is
declining .... Terrorist groups, therefore, increasingly need new sources of
funds, and the drug business fills this need perfectly. ' '2 Drugs fuel terrorism
and economically support the very organizations America has pledged to
defeat . As a result, the confluence of the War on Terror with the War on
Drugs has culminated in the War on Narco-Terror. 4 In post-9/1 1 America, with
mounting evidence that the Taliban is funded by drugs,5 the United States
government increasingly focuses on committing resources to curb this
dangerous practice. 6 Narco-terrorism is the most dangerous national security
1. See Gen. James L. Jones, U.S. Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Speech at the 45th Munich Security
Conference (Feb. 8, 2009) ("It is hard to overstate the differences between the 20th and the 21 st
centuries.... To be blunt, the institutions and approaches that we forged together through the
20th century are still adjusting to meet the realities of the 21st century.").
2. Michael Braun, Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing
Nexus?, in COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: TERRORISM, NARcO-TRAFFICING, AND
WMD PROLIFERATION 27, 27 (Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson eds., 2009).
3. See id. ("Narco-terrorism... provides the economic fuel for insurgencies.").
4. See DOD Counternarcotics: What is Congress Getting for its Money?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the H. Comm.
on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 9 (2004) (statement of Rep. Cummings, Member, H.
Comm. on Government Reform) ("In Afghanistan, where opium production has skyrocketed
since American forces removed the Taliban from power, the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crimes has stressed that the war on terror and the war on drugs are in effect the same
war .... ."); Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong.
5 (2007) (statement of Rep. Mike Pence, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs) ("[T]he war
on drugs is a crucial piece of the war on terror.").
5. See infra Parts II.B.3-4 (citing two instances of the Taliban's involvement with narco-
terrorism).
6. See Obama and Calderon Meet Amidst Rash of Dire Warnings on Mexican Drug
Violence, 568 DRUG WAR CHRON., Jan. 16, 2009, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/568/
obamacalderonmexicodrugwar (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) ("[T]he $1.4 billion, three-year
anti-drug assistance plan [to Mexico] approved by Congress and the Bush administration last
year was barely a drop in the bucket [and is] only a tiny fraction of the money spent on the US
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Department
of Justice, FY 2007 War Supplemental, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/
2008factsheets/pdf/0809_warsupplemental.pdf (requesting "$3.6 million to enhance DEA
Special Operations Division (SOD) support for investigations targeting the international and
transnational threat of narco-terrorism"); Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and
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threat immediately facing Congress,7 and it is readily apparent that legislative
and prosecutorial action against it should be swift and severe.8 Yet, some
restraint remains necessary. United States Attorney General-later Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court-Robert Jackson spoke of the
proper role of a prosecutor in terms that resonate similarly to the role of the
United States and Congress:
Your positions are of such independence and importance that while you are
being diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford
to be just. Although the government technically loses its case, it has really
won ifjustice has been done.... [L]awyers rest their good opinion of each
other not merely on results accomplished but on the quality of the
performance.... Any prosecutor who risks his day-to-day professional
name for fair dealing to build up statistics of success has a perverted sense
of practical values, as well as defects of character. ... [H]e can have no
better asset than to have his profession recognize that his attitude toward
those who feel his power has been dispassionate, reasonable and just.9
Ultimately this Note argues that the proper role of Congress in drafting
effective legislation against narco-terrorism is to be likewise "reasonable and
just." In the context of drafting legislation in the wake of the War on Narco-
Terrorism-A Dangerous Mix: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7
(2003) (statement of Steven W. Casteel, Assistant Adm'r for Intelligence, Drug Enforcement
Administration) ("Prior to September 11, 2001, the law enforcement community typically
addressed drug trafficking and terrorist activities as separate issues. In the wake of the terrorist
attacks in New York City, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, these two criminal activities are
visibly intertwined.").
7. See Rep. Mark Kirk, Congress MustAddress RisingNarcoterrorism, RoLL CALL, Dec.
4, 2006, at 10 ("Congress will face a number of national security issues, none more dangerous
over the next two years than the rise of narcoterrorism .... ").
8. See George W. Bush, Statement at Attorney General Gonzales's Swearing-In
Ceremony (Feb. 14, 2005) ("[T]he Department of Justice in an urgent mission to protect the
United States from another terrorist attack.") (transcript on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Bush spoke to an audience the day he signed the USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005:
America remains a nation at war.... In the face of this ruthless threat, our Nation
has made a clear choice: We will confront mortal danger; we will stay on the
offensive; and we're not going to wait to be attacked again.... The PATRIOT Act
has accomplished exactly what it was designed to do. It has helped us detect terror
cells, disrupt terrorist plots, and save American lives. The bill I sign today extends
these vital provisions.
George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005 (Mar. 9, 2006).
9. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y 18, 18-19
(1940).
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Terror, certainly tough initiatives are necessary, but the duty to act within the
constraints of the Constitution is paramount.'0
In 2006, Congress took an affirmative step to counteract narco-terrorism
by enacting 21 U.S.C. § 960a, which reads in pertinent part:
Whoever engages in [drug activity] that would be punishable... if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States, or attempts or
conspires to do so, knowing or intending to provide, directly or indirectly,
anything ofpecuniary value to any person or organization that has engaged
or engages in terrorist activity.., or terrorism... shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than twice the minimum punishment
[otherwise required for the drug crime], and not more than life .... 1
Congress improperly drafted this statute such that the prosecutorial net may be
cast over those whom Congress did not intend to snare. This may happen in
two ways, and this Note analyzes the implications of this statute from those two
perspectives: the concerns associated with the inchoate nature of conspiracy
law and the integral nexus of drugs and terror.
Part II introduces the history of narco-terrorism and summarizes the
current case law to provide the proper foundation to analyze the future under
this law. Narco-terror is a dangerous threat not only to America but also to the
world. The new narco-terrorism statute has permitted criminal prosecutions
against people willing and able to do serious harm to America.
Part III fully analyzes the necessity of the nexus between drugs and terror
in prosecutions under the statute. The statute requires there to be some drug
crime, and some support of terror, but the nexus between the two is implied,
not expressed. As a result, individuals whom Congress never intended to fall
under the umbrella of narco-terrorism may be prosecuted under this statute.
Well-intentioned prosecutors have the statute as their guide; it is very important
that it is drafted correctly. Why did legislators purposefully omit the drug-
terror nexus from the text of 21 U.S.C. § 960a? Part III focuses on the
necessity of the drug-terror nexus from three facets-the case history of§ 960a,
the textual history of "narco-terrorism," and the statute's history-to help
discern congressional intent. It is obvious that history requires the nexus, but
the statute does not.
10. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (discussing how "[t]he
political branches, consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the
Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values
while protecting the Nation from terrorism").




Part IV delves into conspiracy law and the legitimacy of multiple-inchoate
crimes, especially as they relate to the current narco-terrorism statute. Can an
individual be guilty of"attempting to conspire" to commit narco-terror? Many
scholars and courts have taken issue with such constructions in the past, yet
Congress allowed for the possibility when drafting § 960a.12 How does such a
conviction comport with both congressional intent and due process of law?
Part V suggests multiple hypothetical situations combining elements of the
drug-terror nexus problem with conspiracy law to illustrate potential concerns
with § 960a. It takes the two concerns with § 960a that this Note addresses-
"the nexus" and "conspiracy"-and hypothesizes scenarios whereby both
legitimate and illegitimate outcomes, based on the text of the statute, are
possible. What does the future hold for prosecutions under § 960a? Are there
less dangerous individuals who might be prosecuted for narco-terror who
otherwise would not have been had Congress been more careful in its drafting?
The hypotheticals indicate that there are.
This Note concludes with recommendations to Congress for future
legislation to better achieve the aims of the current law. "Only by extreme care
can we protect the spirit as well as the letter of our civil liberties .... 1113Section 960a is the result of Congress's failure to exercise such extreme care.
II. Narco-Terrorism
A. History: The Buildup to Current Legislation
To predict the future of prosecutions under this law, an examination of
history is in order. "Throughout history, a broad spectrum of... [criminals]
have used their respective power and profits in order to instill the fear and
corruption required to shield them from the law."' 4  Modem-day narco-
terrorism has its roots in the 1980s, when the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC) and other organizations began using the drug trade to
finance their missions. 15 Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry coined
12. See infra Part IV (fully analyzing multiple-inchoate theory).
13. Jackson, supra note 9, at 20.
14. Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism--A Dangerous Mix,
supra note 6, at 7.
15. See Colombia's Most Powerful Rebels, BBC NEws, Sept. 19, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1746777.stm (last visited Oct 21, 2009) (stating that the
FARC began using the drug trade to finance itself in the 1980s) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Drug Enforcement Administration, Fabio Ochoa
Convicted on U.S. Drug Charges (May 30, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrelU
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the term "narco-terrorism" in 1982.16 At that time, the term meant "the union of
the vice of narcotics with the violence of terrorism." 7 Although narco-
terrorism has existed for many decades, its prominence in the news has
expanded only very recently.' 8 The term has spawned varied interpretations,
but its exact contours remain elusive.'
9
Drug-funded terror continues to this day.20 For some time, Congress has
taken note of this escalating problem. For example, Congress has focused on
addressing specific incidents:
In the District of Columbia, in November 2002, 3 separate indictments
were announced charging 11 members of the FARC with the murder of 3
individuals, hostage-taking and drug trafficking involving the distribution
of cocaine bound for the United States.
pr053003.html (last visited Oct. 21,2009) ("Ochoa, along with his brothers, Pablo Escobar and
others made up the Medellin Cartel in the 1980s, and existed until Escobar's death in 1993.")
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Cali Cartel Front Man Pleads Guilty and Is Sentenced On Money Laundering
Charges (May 11,2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/nyc051107.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009) ("Between in or about 1982 and 1995, the Cali Cartel transported and
sold tens of thousands of kilograms of cocaine and ultimately amassed an illicit fortune worth in
excess of$1 billion.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ron Chepesiuk, The
Fall of the Cali Cartel, CRIME MAG., Oct. 21, 2006, http://www.crimemagazine.com/06/
calicartel, 1021-6.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) ("Between mid-August and mid-December of
1989, Escobar and the Medellin Cartel killed 107 officials and civilians, carried out 205
bombings, and caused over $500 million in damages. In 1988 Escobar was responsible for
placing a bomb aboard a Colombian airliner that exploded and killed 107 people.") (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Police Station Attacked Near Site of Peru Prison Break, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Mar. 9, 1982, available at LEXis ("President Fernando Belaunde Terry previously labeled the
attack 'narco-terrorism .... "'); Oxford English Dictionary Online, narco-, comb. form (June
2003), http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00321135 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (indicating first
recorded usage on March 8, 1982, from the Associated Press Newswire, "A new threat to the
free world: Narco-terrorism") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); G. Davidson
Smith, Commentary No. 13: Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Dangerous Compromise in
Colombia, CANADIAN SECURITv INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, Oct. 1991, at 1 ("Former President
Belaunde Terry of Peru coined the term 'narcoterrorism' .... ").
17. Police Station Attacked Near Site of Peru Prison Break, supra note 16.
18. The Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration from 2000-2001 stated that
"for some time we have known a drug-terror nexus exists." Donnie Marshall, Narco-Terrorism:
The New Discovery of an Old Connection, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 599,599(2002). A survey of
Lexis news articles returned from a search of"narco-terrorism" or "narcoterrorism" in five-year
spans beginning with 1980 indicates that the frequency of the term has increased dramatically:
1/1/1980-1/1/1985: six incidents; 1985-1990: 163; 1990-1995: 345; 1995-2000: 377;
2000-2005: 1151; 2005-1/1/2009: 1589.
19. See infra Part III.B (discussing the development of the term's usage).
20. See, e.g., Braun, supra note 2, at 27 ("The Madrid train bombing by al-Qaeda or an
affiliate was funded almost entirely by the sale of illicit drugs.").
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In Houston, Texas, in November 2002, four members of the [AUC] were
caught trying to exchange $25 million of cash and cocaine for weapons,
such as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, 53 million rounds of
ammunition, 9,000 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, along with
almost 300,000 grenades to be used by AUC operatives.
In San Diego, California, in November 2002, two Pakistani nationals and
one United States citizen were charged with attempting to exchange 600
kilograms of heroin and 5 metric tons of hashish for cash and four anti-
aircraft missiles to supply to the Taliban and AI-Qaeda associates.
Recently, in April 2003, the FBI and DEA disrupted a major Afghanistan-
Pakistani [sic] heroin smuggling operation with the arrest of 16 individuals,
in which heroin was being shipped to the United States, profits from the
sale of heroin were laundered through Afghan and Pakistani-owned
businesses in the United States, and then sent back to finance terrorists. 2 1
This is a global phenomenon, and it is becoming increasingly clear that
narco-terrorism is a major threat to the stability of Mexico, Peru, Pakistan,
and other countries. 22 This world-wide issue significantly threatens the United
21. Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism-A Dangerous Mix:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
22. Retired General Barry McCaffrey reported to the United States Military Academy at
West Point in December 2008:
The incoming Obama Administration must immediately focus on the dangerous and
worsening problems in Mexico, which fundamentally threaten US national security.
Before the next eight years are past-the violent, warring collection of criminal
drug cartels could overwhelm the institutions of the state and establish de facto
control over broad regions of northern Mexico.... Mexico is not confronting
dangerous criminality-it is fighting for survival against narco-terrorism.
Memorandum from Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, Adjunct Professor, West Point, to Col. Michael
Meese, Professor, West Point 4 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.mccaffreyassociates.
com/pdfs/MexicoAAR -_December_2008.pdf; see NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENT., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2009, at III (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs3l/31379/31379p.pdf ("Mexican [drug trafficking
organizations] represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States."). Peru's
infamous communist guerilla organization known as the "Shining Path" had been on the decline
for many years. See JAMES F. ROCHLN, VANGUARD REVOLUTIONARIES IN LATIN AMERICA:
PERU, COLOMBIA, MExico 3 (2003) ("Incredibly, the [Shining Path's] power base went from
maximum to zero virtually overnight following the 1992 capture of its charismatic and
dictatorial leader, Abimael Guzmn."). It appears now that activity among the Shining Path is
on the rise. See Dan Collyns, Peru Guerrillas Tread a New Path, BBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2009,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 7830215.stm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2009) ("Recently the Shining Path has sprung back from relative obscurity
to launch its most deadly attacks in more than a decade.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). It currently controls a "key drug-trafficking corridor" and its members have
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States.2 3 Consider the following:
As [foreign terrorist organizations] become more heavily involved in the
drug trade, hybrid organizations are emerging, foreign terrorist
organizations that have morphed into one part terrorist organization, one
part global drug cartel. The Taliban and FARC-two perfect examples-
are, in essence, the face of twenty-first-century organized crime, a visage
meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have
heretofore faced. These hybrids represent the most significant security
challenge to governments worldwide.
24
In response to these and other threats to America, Congress enacted the
USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and reauthorized many of its sunsetting provisions
in 2005 .25 As part of the reauthorization, Congress introduced the narco-
terrorism statute, which President George W. Bush signed into law in 2006.
B. Four Cases Demonstrate the Status Quo
To date, the United States has prosecuted four cases under the 2006 narco-
terrorism law.26 It is likely that the rate of these prosecutions will increase
dramatically in the near future.27 Understanding the history of these cases
"killed some [twenty-five] soldiers and police officers in ambushes and gun battles." Id. The
United States Joint Forces Command made it clear in its 2008 Joint Operations Environment
that "[iun terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and
important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico."
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND, JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT: CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE 36 (2008), available at http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/
storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf.
23. See 109 CONG. REC. S9846 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Comyn)
(discussing how "modem day narco-terrorists" have affected Texas).
24. Braun, supra note 2, at 28.
25. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.) (enacting laws "[t]o deter and punish
terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement
investigatory tools, and for other purposes"); USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.) (reauthorizing provisions "[t]o extend and modify authorities needed to combat
terrorism, and for other purposes"); Bush, Statement at Attorney General Gonzales's Swearing-
In Ceremony, supra note 8 ("Many key elements of the PATRIOT Act are now set to expire at
the end of this year.... To protect the American people, Congress must promptly renew all
provisions of the PATRIOT Act this year.").
26. See infra Parts II.B.1-4 (detailing the prosecutions).
27. See Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and US. Policy, Cong.
Research Serv. RL32686, at 27 (Dec. 7, 2004) ("New reform efforts plan to develop special
prosecution teams to investigate and prosecute prominent figures in the Afghan opium trade.");
1888
NARCO-TERRORISM
allows for a proper prediction for future cases. Especially important for this
prediction is the observation that each of these four cases involved a clear drug-
terror nexus28 and no multiple-inchoate constructions,29 rendering them helpful,
but not dispositive, in this Note's analysis. Thus, they represent the status quo
in narco-terror prosecutions. Deviations from these models should cause
concern for those prosecuted.
1. United States v. Corredor-Ibague
A grand jury issued the first indictment under 21 U.S.C. § 960a in 2006
against Josd Maria Corredor-Ibague and nine others.30  A member of the
FARC, Corredor-Ibague is currently awaiting trial on these charges. 31 The
FARC is "an armed and violent organization" that is "engaged... in armed
conflict against the government of the Republic of Colombia."32 The FARC
"seeks to destabilize all levels of the Colombian government by means of
violence, including murders and hostage takings, threats of violence, and other
terrorist related activities."33 It has been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization, and "has been strongly anti-American, characterizing American
citizens as 'military targets,' and has engaged in violent acts against Americans
in Colombia.
34
It is alleged that Corredor-Ibague controlled "clandestine airstrips in the
jungles of Southern Colombia" from which "small aircraft flew out multi-
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION 27
(2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2009justification/pdf/fy09-dea.pdf ("With the
implementation of the amended 21 U.S.C. [§] 960a, DEA's role in narco-terrorism
investigations and prosecutions expanded significantly.").
28. For a summary of the drug-terror connections in these cases, see infra Part III.A.
29. Each case involved a direct charge of violating 21 U.S.C. § 960a, not § 963
(conspiracy to commit § 960a). For further discussion of this matter, see infra Part IV.
30. See Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Corredor-Ibague, No. 04-212
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2006) (listing a total of ten defendants); Jim Kouri, Colombian FARC
Terrorists Extradited to US on Terrorism and Drug Charges, CAN. FREE PRESS, Oct. 20,2008,
http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/5689 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) ("Corredor-Ibague
was the first person in the nation to be indicted under this narco-terrorism statute, which became
law in March 2006.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See Revised Ex Parte Motion for Interim Payments for Attorneys, Investigators and
Interpreters Appointed Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) at 2, Corredor-lbague, No. 04-212
(D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2009) ("[A] trial date in the near future appears unrealistic."); Kouri, supra note
30 (identifying the defendant as a member of the FARC).
32. Indictment at 1-2, Corredor-Ibague, No. 06-344 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2006).
33. Indictment, supra note 32, at 2.
34. Indictment, supra note 32, at 2.
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hundred kilogram quantities of cocaine ... destined for the United States."35
The Government alleges that he "organized these shipments, manufactured and
sold the cocaine, and [remitted taxes] on the cocaine [to the FARC]" and also
imported "small arms weaponry which was used by the FARC to supply its
armed forces."
3 6
2. United States v. Jim~nez-Naranjo
A superseding indictment originating in the District Court for the District
of Columbia on September 25, 2007 charged Carlos Mario Jimdnez-Naranjo
with violation of § 960a.37 It is alleged that Jim6nez-Naranjo was "a high-
ranking leader of the Autodefensas Unidas de Columbia ('AUC')."38 The AUC
is "a Colombian right-wing paramilitary and drug-trafficking organization. "
39
The U.S. Department of State has considered it a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) since September 2001 .40 The Government alleges that
Jimdnez-Naranjo "controlled all aspects of the cocaine industry from the coca
producing land to the transportation routes for sending large quantities of
cocaine. "41 The defendant controlled approximately 9,000 soldiers as an AUC
leader and was involved in the manufacture and transportation of "multi-ton
quantities of cocaine destined for the United States."
4 2
35. Kouri, supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. See Indictment at 2-3, United States v. Jimdnez-Naranjo, No. 05-235 (D.D.C. Sept.
25, 2007) (charging the defendant with conspiracy to violate § 960a).
38. Detention Memorandum at 2, Jiminez-Naranjo, No. 05-235 (D.D.C. May 13,2008).
39. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Colombian Paramilitary Leader Extradited to the
United States to Face U.S. Drug Charges (May 7, 2008), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/May/08-crm-388.html.
40. See id. (indicating the Foreign Terrorist Organization status of the AUC); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (July 7, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (listing the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization).
41. Detention Memorandum, supra note 38, at 2.
42. See Government's Motion under the Speedy Trial Act for Continuance Based on
Complex Case and to Exclude Time to Obtain Evidence from a Foreign Country at 2-3,




3. United States v. Mohammed
The third indictment involving the narco-terrorism statute was filed
against Khan Mohammed on January 23, 2008.43 Mohammed was found guilty
of violating § 960a and was the first person to be convicted under that statute.
44
He was an associate of the Taliban,
an organization of extremist Muslims currently conducting an insurgent
campaign to rid Afghanistan of "infidels[,"] overthrow the current
government, and install itself in power by means of force and acts of
terrorism. Further, the Taliban engage in drug trafficking in order to
finance the acquisition of weapons, ammunition and equipment necessary
to conduct its attacks on coalition forces, the Afghan government and
45anyone else who stands in their way.
Mohammed's responsibilities included coordinating terrorist attacks, which he
46had conducted in the past and was actively planning for the future. He was
also an experienced drug trafficker, and "money earned from that drug
trafficking was used to support himself and advance the cause of the Taliban.
47
Mohammed admitted to producing and selling opium.48  A recorded
conversation indicates that he was influential in planning and executing
terrorist attacks. 49 Khan Mohammed was ordered to serve a life sentence for
43. See Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C.
Jan. 23, 2008) (charging Mohammed with violating 21 U.S.C. § 960a).
44. See Verdict Form at 1, Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C. May 15,2008) (finding the
defendant guilty); Government's Response to Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum at 19,
Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2008) ("Khan Mohammed is the first ever defendant
convicted under § 960a."); Jim Kouri, Afghan Taliban Gets Life Sentence in Nation's First
Conviction for Narco-Terrorism, HuNTINGTON NEWS, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.
huntingtonnews.net/national/081228-kouri-nationaltalibansentence.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2009) ("The conviction represented the first time a defendant had been convicted in US federal
court of narco-terrorism since the statute was enacted in March 2006.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 1-2, Mohammed, No. 06-357
(D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2008).
46. Id.
47. Id. at2.
48. Post-Arrest Statements of Taliban Operator Khan Mohammed, on October 29, 2006
8, at 3, Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C. Jan 16, 2008) ("Mohammed said... [h]e sold ten
kilograms of opium to Jalat.... The opium he sold was produced by him two years ago from
his own poppy.").
49. See Transcript of Recorded Conversation on August 18,2006, Court Exhibit 2A at 4,
line 30, Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C. May 1, 2008) (implicating Mohammed in these
attacks); id. at 7, line 50 ("We fired rockets at the county-chief office .... "). The recordings
revealed Mohammed's intentions:
What they do is to kill the Americans. The Americans are infidels and Jihad is
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violating 21 U.S.C. § 960a.5 °
4. United States v. Khan
On October 21, 2008, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New
York charged Haji Juma Khan with violating 21 U.S.C. § 960a.5 Khan "led an
international opium, morphine and heroin trafficking organization" known as
the "Khan Organization.
'" 52
The Khan Organization has contracted to supply other drug traffickers with
morphine base, which can be processed into heroin, in quantities as large as
40 tons. This is enough to supply the entire United States heroin market for
more than two years. The Khan Organization also operates labs within
Afghanistan that produce refined heroin, and the organization sells the
heroin in quantities of as much as 100 kilograms and more.
53
Khan has been "closely aligned with the Taliban" and has "supported the
Taliban's efforts to forcibly remove the United States and its allies from
Afghanistan., 5 4 He is alleged to have "provided financial support to the
Taliban, in the form of the proceeds of the Khan Organization's drug
trafficking activities, in exchange for protection for the organization's drug
trafficking operations. 5 5 Particularly, Khan is alleged to have "engaged in an
approximately 700 kilogram morphine base transaction," utilized agents to
allowed against them. If we have to fire [the missiles] toward the airport, we will
do it and if not the airport, wherever they are stationed we will fire at their base too.
I mean we have to use the mines too. God willing, we and you will keep doing our
Jihad [sic].
Id. at 4, line 30 (alterations in original).
50. See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1-3, Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,
2008) (finding the defendant guilty of violating § 960a and ordering him to life in prison).
51. See Sealed Indictment at 3, United States v. Khan, No. 08-CR-621 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21,
2008), 1 8 ("[T]he defendant, and others..., unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did
combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other to violate [21 U.S.C.
§ 960a].").
52. Id. at2.
53. Id. at 2-3.
54. Id. at 3; see Jim Kouri, Drug Kingpin Charged with Financing Taliban Terrorist
Insurgency, EXAMINER.COM, Feb. 1,2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-
Examiner-y2009m2d-Drug-Kingpin-charged-with-financing-Taliban-terrorist-insurgency (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (recounting factual allegations against Khan) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. Sealed Indictment, supra note 51, at 3.
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supply heroin to others, and remitted payments to the Taliban. 6 Khan has
pleaded not guilty and is currently awaiting trial.57
I1. Drug-Terror Nexus: Necessary?
The current narco-terrorism statute, when analyzed in light of its
legislative and textual history, creates the possibility that prosecutorial
discretion will diverge from congressional intent. Based solely on the current
text of the statute, little emphasis is placed on the required nexus between drugs
and terror:
Whoever engages in [drug activity] that would be punishable... if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States, or attempts or
conspires to do so, knowing or intending to provide, directly or indirectly,
anything of pecuniary value to any person or organization that has engaged
or engages in terrorist activity... or terrorism... shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than twice the minimum punishment
[otherwise required for the drug crime], and not more than life .... 58
This observation begs the question: Could somebody be prosecuted for
violation of § 960a if the drug activity is not connected---even indirectly-to
the terror support?
It is clear that throughout history, the concept of-and laws against-
narco-terrorism has included an explicit nexus between drugs and terror.59
Indeed, the very word "narco-terrorism" conjures up an image of drug-dealing
terrorists. Why, then, did legislators purposefully60 omit the drug-terror nexus
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. See Afghan Arraigned in Narco-Terrorism Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/24/AR2008102403658.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2009) ("Haji Juma Khan, 54, pleaded not guilty through an interpreter in
U.S. District Court in Manhattan.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Larry
Neumeister, Afghan Arrested in NY Narco-Terrorism Case, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-24-afghan-drug-trialN.htm (last visited Oct.
21,2009) ("'I am not guilty,' [Khan] said.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 960a (2006).
59. See infra Parts II.A-C (reflecting on the history of the nexus associated with narco-
terror).
60. The legislative history of § 960a does not indicate whether the missing nexus was
purposeful. See infra Part III.C (chronicling the statute's legislative history). The history does
indicate that a nexus was present in early drafts of the statute, but was later deleted before
signed into law. See infra Part III.C (indicating that the change evolved in the Conference
Committee's report). This Note presumes that Congress intends its actions; Congress deleted
the important language on purpose. See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,270-71 (2000)
(determining that calling a congressional deletion of statutory language a stylistic change, with
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from the text of § 960a? Justice Frankfurter admonishes readers to analyze the
meaning of a statute by "listen[ing] attentively to what it does not say. ', 6' Does
this indicate congressional intent to criminalize further (by way of doubling the
sentence of the drug crime) the support of terrorism, even if there is no
connection between the drug crime and the support of terror? An examination
of the case, textual, and statutory histories of narco-terrorism will reveal that
Congress eliminated a necessary element of narco-terrorism-the drug-terror
nexus-from the statute, compromising the clarity of the legislature's purpose.
A. The Case History Supports the Nexus
So far, case law has not provided courts with the opportunity to consider
the outcome of a prosecution in which there is no connection between the drug
and terror activity. All four of the prosecutions under § 960a, outlined in Parts
II.B. 1-4 above, have had a direct link between the drug and terror activity-
what this Note calls the "drug-terror nexus. 6 2 Allegedly, Corredor-Ibague paid
taxes from the sale of cocaine to the FARC, a terrorist organization;63 Jimdnez-
Naranjo was a leader of 9,000 AUC soldiers who produced many tons of
cocaine;64 Mohammed helped export opium to "turn all the infidels into dead
corpses" ;65 and Khan contracted to provide funds to the Taliban in exchange for
protection of his drug-trafficking organization. 66 Other narco-terrorism crimes
67that have concerned Congress clearly demonstrate this drug-terror nexus.
no substantive effects, "misunderstands" the Court's "approach to statutory interpretation" and
that "[in analyzing a statute, we begin by examining the text"); Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001) ("We ordinarily will not assume that Congress intended 'to enact
statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language."' (quoting INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987))). In Carter, the Court made clear that "[a]s is
often the case, the legislative history, even if it is relevant, supports conflicting inferences and
provides scant illumination." Carter, 530 U.S. at 271 n.9. For further discussion on this topic,
see infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
61. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 536 (1947) ("One more caution is relevant when one is admonished to listen attentively to
what a statute says. One must also listen attentively to what it does not say.").
62. See supra Parts II.B.1-4 (summarizing the current case law).
63. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (chronicling Corredor-lbague's crimes).
64. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing Jimdnez-Naranjo's involvement
in narco-terrorism).
65. Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, supra note 45, at 8.
66. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (recounting Khan's connection with the
Taliban).




The consistency of prosecuting individuals who have a direct drug-terror
nexus could be the product of a number of factors. First, § 960a is a young
statute, and such a small number of cases reduces the mathematical probability
that "a bad case" could get through. Second, § 960a is an important statute, and
there is high public scrutiny surrounding these prosecutions; a questionable
prosecution this early would raise eyebrows. Third, § 960a is a sensitive
statute, such that it seems great care goes into successfully prosecuting narco-
terrorists; the cases have been prosecuted by those "who temper[] zeal with
human kindness, who seek[] truth and not victims, who serve[] the law and not
factional purposes, and who approach[ the] task with humility. 68 Regardless
of the reason, it is clear that the current case law supports an implied drug-
terror nexus.
B. The Textual History Complicates the Issue
Since the term originated, narco-terrorism has had an implied link between
drugs and terror.69 The very use of the hyphen with the words indicates a link
between "narcotics" and "terrorism." As narco-terrorism expanded in the last
several decades, so has its meaning. In 1982, Peruvian President Fernando
Belaunde Terry used the term to describe "the union of the vice of narcotics
with the violence of terrorism" and "[a] marriage of vice with violence. 70 As
early as 1984, however, it seemed that the word was gaining a wider acceptance
without such a clear drug-terror nexus. 71 That year, the term was used to
describe the Nicaraguan government's involvement with a drug-running
operation from Colombia to Florida.72 Although the primary drug-runners were
notorious narco-terrorists by any definition of the word-including Pablo
68. Jackson, supra note 9, at 20.
69. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (reviewing the first use of the term
narco-terrorism).
70. Police Station Attacked Near Site of Peru Prison Break, supra note 16; Alliance
Threatens Fragile Democracy, Peru Links Rebel Group with Drug Dealers, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, Mar. 16, 1982, at 13.
71. See Douglas Stevenson, [Nicaraguan Government Involved in Narco-Terrorism],
UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 8, 1984, available at LEXIS (using the term to describe the
Nicaraguan military assistance in transporting cocaine to the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. This incident involved the DEA and CIA working together with an American
cooperator who flew drugs into the United States from Colombia. See DuANE R. CLARRIDGE, A
SPY FOR ALL SEASONS: MY LIFE IN THE CIA 286 (Simon and Schuster 2002) (1986) (describing
the operation).
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Escobar-the word was used to describe the Nicaraguan government, which
appears to have done little more than assist in transportation and refueling.
73
In 1984, the word's meaning lost more clarity when it was used to
describe the battle between drug-growers and drug-suppressers.74 It seems that
the line between traditional "narco-terrorism" and drug manufacturers
protecting their livelihoods was blurring. One reporter gave examples ofnarco-
terrorism in 1984:
Colombia. Two leftist rebel armies shield mountainside growers from
military interference. Cocaine sent to Cuba buys arms for guerrillas.
Peru. A multimillion-dollar U.S. drug-eradication program withers as
Shining Path guerrillas seal off critical areas from agents and troops.
Bolivia. Chaos created by Communists, neo-Nazis, armed dealers and an
ineffective Army halts America's 2.4-million-dollar antidrug drive.
Brazil. Lax officials allow new coca-growing enterprises to flourish.
Lebanon. Cockpit of Mideast wars is transfer point for Palestinian gunmen,
Christian militiamen and Syrian troops who trade in hashish.
Afghanistan. Mountain tribes ship raw opium to Pakistan and Iran, use
cash to buy weapons that guerrillas need to fight Soviet occupation.
Burma. Secessionist Kachin, Karen, Shan tribesmen, plus Communist
guerrillas, buy arms with profits from selling drugs in Laos, Thailand.75
Thus, a diverse array of activities was included under the "narco-terrorism"
label. As the 1980s spawned the large-scale profitability of narcotics, those
profits were non-discriminatory. Tribesmen in Afghanistan sold raw opium to
73. See Stevenson, supra note 71 ("Photographs taken by Drug Enforcement Agency
informants and released by Sen. Paula Hawkins, R-Fla., allegedly show Nicara[gu]an
government involv[e]ment in 'narco-terrorism."'). Although the term "narco-terrorism" was
used to refer to the Nicaraguan government's involvement, it appears they were assisting
primarily in transportation, and not in the terrorist acts themselves. See CLARRIDGE, supra note
72, at 286 ("[The] plane [was] on the Sandinista runway .... Among the others was Sandinista
minister of interior Tomas Borge's executive assistant Federico Vaughan. To cap it all, one of
the photos showed a clearly marked Sandinista military fuel trailer alongside the clamshell door,
standing by to refuel the aircraft.").
74. Drug Trade Finances Revolution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 27, 1984, at 35
("'Narco terrorism' is code word for a new, mushrooming type of war that steadily is worsening.
From Peru to Burma, drug-producing peasants and guerrillas are pitted against drug-suppressing




finance their struggle against the U.S.S.R.7 6 Paramilitary organizations in
South America exchanged guns for drugs to commit terrorist acts on civilians
and government targets.77 The confusion surrounding this broad-sweeping term
led the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to declare that narco-terrorism
was "a subject of definitional controversy" in 1991.
78
Since that time, the term has not gained clarity. In 2001, Raphael Perl
spoke at the National Symposium on Narco-Terrorism. 79 Perl, the Senior
Policy Analyst for International Terrorism and Narcotics with the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, noted that "[t]he
links between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations are well documented"
but "[t]he line between them is becoming increasingly difficult to draw."80 If
the drug-terror nexus is not a new phenomenon, what has changed? Penl
provides an answer.8 ' He identified three major changes in the drug-terror
culture that have blurred this line: first, an "increasingly deregulated and
interconnected global economy"; second, "[drugs as] an attractive and highly
lucrative source of income for [terrorists]"; and third, "the enhanced threat level
that the combined forces of drug trafficking and terrorism pose to [the United
States]."82 These changes seem to have culminated in terrorists using drugs as a
sort of "weapon of mass destruction. '" 83 Case in point: Khan Mohammed84
indicated in recorded conversations with a confidential informant, Jaweed, that
opium was to be used as a weapon against Americans:
76. See id. ("[Afghani m]ountain tribes ship raw opium to Pakistan and Iran, use cash to
buy weapons that guerrillas need to fight Soviet occupation.").
77. See Michael Isikoff, Noriega Said to Be Part of Guns-for-Drugs Deal, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 1991, at A4 ("Panamanian Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega personally authorized the
shipment of 1,000 M-16 rifles to Colombia's Medellin drug cartel in exchange for cocaine that
was to be distributed in this country... .
78. Smith, supra note 16, at 1.
79. See Raphael Francis Perl, Senior Policy Analyst for Int'l Terrorism and Narcotics,
Cong. Research Serv. of the Library of Cong., Address at the National Symposium on Narco-
Terrorism: Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists & Your Kids 20-28 (Dec. 4, 2001)
[hereinafter Narco-Terrorism Symposium] (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dea/ongoing/symposium-transcript.doc) (discussing the "global outlook and the history of the
war against illegal narcotics").
80. Id. at21.
81. See id. at 22 ("If links between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations, the so-
called 'guns for drugs connection,' are well established and not new, then what are we seeing
here today that is new?").
82. Id. at 22-23.
83. See Steven W. Casteel, Assistant Adm'r for Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Admin.,
Narco-Terrorism Symposium, supra note 79, at 33 (calling drugs a fourth weapon of mass
destruction).
84. For a summary of United States v. Mohammed, see supra Part II.B.3.
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[Jaweed]: "This opium is going abroad and all other powders are going
abroad."
[Mohammed]: "Good, may God turn all the infidels to dead corpses."
[Jaweed]: "All right, is it possible to find powder?"
[Mohammed]: "There are a lot, as much as you need I will give it to you.
Two things would be done: one, as they say, the Jihad would be performed
since they send it to America.0
5
It is here that a divergence occurs. There are those who use drugs as a
weapon to target Americans or use the sale of drugs directly to finance
terrorism.8 6 Separately, there are those who may be charged with violating
§ 960a when the drug-terror nexus is not so noticeably present.87 This review
of the textual history of narco-terrorism reveals wide disparity among
definitions, rendering it difficult for Congress to indicate precisely what it
means by simply using the word "narco-terror."
In summary, it seems as though neither the case law of § 960a nor the
history of narco-terrorism provides much guidance to help determine the
necessity of the nexus "that is growing at quantum speed. 88 Importantly,
statutory history is a better indicator of legislative intent.8 9 A study of the
legislative history will show that Congress considered, and then ultimately
rejected, drafting the required nexus into the statute.
C. The Statutory History Exposes Congressional Error
Of course, in addition to facial textual analysis, statutory history is an
important tool to help discern legislative intent, to which the courts often give
85. Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, supra note 45, at 7-8.
86. Steven Casteel suggested that the fifty-three kilograms of Afghan heroin seized in
New York City two days prior to 9/11 was part of a terrorist attack on America. See Casteel,
supra note 83, at 33 (using this example to "argue that we've been under attack in this country
for a long time, and [that] it didn't start on the 11 th [of September 2001]").
87. See infra Part V (suggesting hypotheticals when this may be possible).
88. Braun, supra note 2, at 27.
89. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606 (1991) (indicating that
legislative history is an important tool in discerning congressional intent).
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great deference. 90 The importance of providing prosecutors proper statutes is
paramount:
What every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases for
prosecution and to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the
public harm the greatest, and the proof the most certain.... With the law
books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair
chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of
almost anyone. [It is in] such a case ... that the greatest danger of abuse of
prosecuting power lies.91
The text of § 960a does not expressly require a drug-terror nexus. To
violate this statute, one must "engage in [drug-related] conduct... knowing or
intending to provide.., pecuniary value to any person or organization that has
engaged or engages in terrorist activity. 9 2 Compared to earlier versions of this
statute, below, § 960a does not seem to necessitate a link between the drug
activity and the terrorism. Yet, the link between the two seemed vitally
important leading up to the passage of the act: "[T]he events of September 11
have brought a new focus on an old problem, narco-terrorism.... In
attempting to combat this threat, the link between drugs and terrorism has come
to the fore.... [T]he nexus between drugs and terrorism is perilously
evident.
9 3
The analysis of this statute's history begins before its incorporation in the
USA PATRIOT Act's reauthorization with Representative Henry Hyde's
proposed Narco-Terrorism Enforcement Act of 2005. 94  In his speech
introducing the Act on May 24, 2005, Representative Hyde stated:
The nexus between terrorism and illicit narcotics grows more and more as
evidence emerges of their common, supportive links and as the use also
increases of drug trafficking routes to move both narcotics and
terrorists.... In addition, this bill raises the penalties under the material
support-for-terrorism statute to reflect the seriousness of this offense. This
90. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("In recent years the Court has suggested that we should only look at legislative
history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities .... It would be wiser to acknowledge
that it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress'[s] true intent when
interpreting its work product.").
91. Jackson, supra note 9, at 19.
92. 21 U.S.C. § 960a (2006).
93. Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism-A Dangerous Mix:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10 (2003) (statement of Steven W.
Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration).
94. See 151 CONG. REc. E1073 (daily ed. May 24, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hyde)
(introducing the Narco-Terrorism Enforcement Act of 2005).
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bill reflects the new reality, emerging challenges, and ever-clearer drug
links on the global terrorism front.
9s
The Narco-Terrorism Enforcement Act of 2005 evolved soon after its proposal
into § 960a.96 It is clear that the drug-terror nexus was in the forefront of the
legislature's intentions.
On July 21, 2005, Representative Hyde rose to the floor to offer an
amendment to the USA PATRIOT Act's reauthorization. 97 The text of the
amendment was the first statutorily expressed connection between drugs and
terror in narco-terrorism: "Whoever... manufactures, distributes, imports,
exports, or possesses with intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled
substance, ... knowing or intending that such activity, directly or indirectly,
aids or provides support, resources, or anything of pecuniary value to
[terrorism] .... ,,98 The same statutory language was read to the Senate on July
29, 2005.99 The three words "that such activity" make the necessary connection
between the drug activity and the terror support; the individual must know or
intend that the drug activity is supporting terror. It is this connection that is
visibly absent from the current statute. The day that this amendment was
offered, Representative Hyde spoke about its implications:
I am very pleased to offer an amendment to the USA PATRIOT
Reauthorization Act which deals with the new reality of overlapping links
between illicit narcotics and global terrorism. Evidence of this deadly and
emerging symbiotic relationship is overwhelming. My amendment creates
a new crime that will address and punish those who would use these illicit
narcotics to promote and support terrorism.... My amendment... makes
it a Federal crime.., to engage in drug trafficking that [supports
terrorism].100
Other Representatives made it equally clear that the drug-terror nexus is
implied, if not expressed. Representative Lungren proclaimed, "[T]he Hyde
amendment recognizes a new reality in a very real danger that is growing: the
95. Id.
96. Indeed, the elapsed time between the introduction of the Narco-Terrorism
Enforcement Act of 2005 and its incorporation into the USA PATRIOT Act was fifty-eight
days.
97. See 151 CONG. REc. H6292 (daily ed. July 21, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hyde)
(offering the amendment).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. 151 CONG. Rnc. S9567-68 (daily ed. July 29, 2005).




deadly mix of drug trafficking and terrorism."'' t° He noted that "[t]he evidence
linking these two criminal activities is overwhelming.... The Hyde
amendment simply creates a new Federal crime for the trafficking of controlled
substances which are intended to benefit a... terrorist organization."'12 He
even gave specific examples of this nexus:
Terrorists in Afghanistan are now infiltrating and controlling the cultivation
of poppy and ultimately heroin. The deadly bombings in Spain were
financed through drug money. Hezbollah has been linked to drug
trafficking from South America to the Middle East; and of course the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has long3standing drug
trafficking operations which fund their deadly activities.
It is apparent that the link between drugs and terror was the focus of the
legislators when enacting this amendment. 104
On September 8, 2005, Senator Comyn introduced a bill "[t]o prohibit
narco-terrorists from aiding and supporting terrorists and terrorist
organizations." 10 5 The language of this bill began to reflect more closely that of
the current § 960a, yet it still contained the "nexus language" found in the
House version.'16 In supporting this bill, Senator Cornyn not only echoed the
important nexus between drug traffickers and terrorists but also elaborated on
this connection:
This bill confronts the new reality and very real danger of the deadly mix of
drug trafficking and terrorism.... Post 9/11, governments now find
themselves combating classic terrorist groups that participate in, or
otherwise receive funds from, drug trafficking in order to further their
agenda. But whether narco-terrorists are actual drug traffickers who use
terrorism against civilians to advance their agenda, or are principally
terrorists who out of convenience or necessity use drug money to further
their cause, the label of narco-terrorist may be equally applicable to both
groups, and the full force of U.S. law should be brought to bear on these
organizations.
10 7
101. Id. at H6293 (statement of Rep. Lungren).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. In closing the discussion, Representative Hyde reinforced this fact. Id. at H6294
(statement of Rep. Hyde) ("There is a definite link between the illicit narcotics trade and the
financing of terrorism. We have taken a focused look at that link, and this is an attempt to
disrupt it and destroy it.").
105. S. 1642, 109th Cong. (2005).
106. That is, it also contained the "that such activity" language included in the House
version. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (explaining significance of the phrase).
107. 151 CONG. REc. S9846 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Comyn). Senator
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Senator Comyn's statements beg the question: If the term "narco-
terrorism" may be applied to both drug traffickers-who use terrorism to
further their agenda-and terrorists-who use drug money to further their
cause-with whom else may this term be associated? Are there other, less
dangerous individuals who may be swept up in a narco-terror prosecution? The
drug-terror nexus seems to serve as one protection against that possibility. That
is, so long as the statute includes the requirement that the drug activity and the
terrorism support be linked, only the most culpable and dangerous narco-
terrorists would be targeted. Without that link, Congress simply is creating
redundant punishments for those who commit multiple crimes. Representative
Scott identified this possibility early on: "Drug trafficking and terrorism crimes
already carry numerous penalties for the most egregious offenses, so we do not
need them anew in this case."' 0 8
After the two houses of Congress disagreed on the text of the USA
PATRIOT Reauthorization Act, it was sent to the Conference Committee.
Representative Sensenbrenner proposed the Conference Committee's
recommendation to the House on December 8, 2005.109 For the most part, the
Conference Committee's recommendations regarding narco-terrorism were
barely noticeable. 0 One change, however, seemed to escape the attention of
Comyn also made statements indicating the integral nexus at issue:
The legislation I introduce today creates a new Federal crime designed to punish
the trafficking of controlled substances which are intended to benefit a foreign
terrorist organization or any one else planning a terrorist attack.... This bill says
that whether you are a member of or assisting a drug cartel along the border that
employs terrorist tactics to protect its drug trade, or you are assisting international
terrorists with the proceeds from drug transactions, this bill targets you.
Id.
108. 151 CONG. REc. H6293 (daily ed. July 21, 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott).
109. See H.R. REP. No. 109-333, at 34-36 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (publishing the
Committee's recommended narco-terrorism statutory language); 151 CONG. REC. HI 1288-89
(daily ed. Dec. 8, 2005) (same). The Supreme Court has indicated that Conference Reports are
especially indicative of congressional intent. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76
(1984) ("In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source
for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t]
the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation."' (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))).
110. The managers on the part of the House and the Senate submitted a joint statement to
each to explain the effect of the changes agreed upon and recommended in the conference
report:
Section 122 of the conference report is substantively similar to section 124 of the
House bill. There is no comparable provision in the Senate amendment. This
section adds new section 101 OA to Part A of the Controlled Substance Import and
Export Act, (21 U.S.C. §§ 951 et seq.), making it a Federal crime to engage in drug
trafficking to benefit terrorists. The conference report changes the mandatory
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the managers of the House and Senate who summarized the Conference
Committee's amendments."' The phrase "that such activity," which originally
constructed a required drug-terror nexus, was absent.' 12
This deletion was clearly overlooked in the summary of the amendments.
The summary stated that "[this section] mak[es] it a Federal crime to engage in
drug trafficking to benefit terrorists,"' '13 implying that the nexus requirement
was still present, even though it was not. The Supreme Court has relied on
deletions during statutory revisions as indicative of congressional intent, and it
is clear that this wording change is important." 4 Even so, the record indicates
that Congress did not notice the change. This includes Representative Hyde,
author of the original bill:
I am very pleased with the conference report... to renew the PATRIOT
Act.... [T]he bill includes an added provision, which I authored, offering a
new tool to attack the growing phenomenon of narco-terrorism, with the
proceeds of illicit drug funding and financing feeding the Foreign Terrorist
Organizations... and supporting acts of terrorism. Passage of the
PATRIOT Act conference report will enhance Federal criminal law to
effectively address the current reality ... of illicit drugs being linked to
nearly half of the designated FTOs around the globe today.
In this measure, my provision makes narcoterrorism, which involves both
the illicit drug trade and support for terrorism, a Federal crime, and
provides tough penalties that match the nature of such deadly and dual
criminal activity.' 1
5
If the answer to the question "Why did Congress eliminate the drug-terror
nexus from § 960a?" exists, it certainly is not readily apparent. The fact
minimum penalty from the [twenty] years provided in the House bill to simply
twice the minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Finally, the conference report
modifies the proof requirements of the House-passed bill to clarify that a person
must have knowledge that the person or organization has engaged or engages in
terrorist activity or terrorism.
151 CONG. REc. HI 1305 (daily ed. Dec. 8,2005); see id. at H 11302 (describing the explanation
process).
111. See supra note 110 (reprinting text of the summary).
112. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the phrase "that such
activity"); H.R. REP. No. 109-333, at 34-36 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (publishing the Committee's
recommended narco-terrorism statutory language).
113. H.R. REP. No. 109-333, at 98 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
114. See, e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 292 (1992) (finding that a simple
deletion in statutory language is indicative of congressional intent of the deletion's
consequences).
115. 151 CONG. REC. HI 1538 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
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remains that given the full history of what narco-terrorism entails, the nexus
should be there, but it is not. This could cause concern in the future if a
careless prosecutor--or worse, a prosecutor "who risks his day-to-day
professional name for fair dealing to build up statistics of success"' 6--casts the
narco-terror net over an individual who may commit these separate, unlinked
crimes.
IV. Conspiracy: Legitimate?
Besides the lack of a drug-terror nexus in the text of § 960a, there is
another problematic aspect with the statute: Conspiracy law. "Conspiracy is an
inchoate offense." " 7 It does not require the completion of the substantive crime
to be punishable by law."18 Combining multiple statutes with inchoate liability
aspects-including § 960a-may result in multiple-inchoate liability, which
courts have struggled both to understand and to accept." 9
Section 960a explicitly references conspiracy.120 The statute requires that
an individual commit a drug offense, or attempt or conspire to do so. 12 1 This
does not appear problematic at first. However, just a few sections away, in 21
U.S.C. § 963, the law provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy.'
22
Ultimately, this means that one could be guilty of § 963 (attempt or
conspiracy to commit § 960a), the substantive offense in § 960a being
116. Jackson, supra note 9, at 19.
117. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). Inchoate crimes include
conspiracy, attempt, and solicitation. Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2007).
The statute in question here specifically includes conspiracy and attempt. See21 U.S.C. § 960a
(2006) (punishing those who engage in specified conduct or "attempt[] or conspire[] to do so").
118. See Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7 n. 10(1989)
(observing that the Model Penal Code drafters indicate that inchoate crimes criminalize conduct
that is "'designed to culminate in the commission of a substantive offense, but has failed in the
discrete case to do so... because there is something that the actor or another still must do"')
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 cmt. at 293 (Proposed Official Draft 1985)).
119. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (detailing the courts' struggles with
multiple-inchoate liability).
120. See 21 U.S.C. § 960a (2006) (punishing those who engage in specified conduct or
"conspire[] to do so").
121. See id. (punishing those who engage in specified conduct or "attempt[] or conspire[]
to do so").
122. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (2006) (emphasis added).
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conspiracy or attempt to commit a drug crime to support terrorism. 
23
Conceivably, one could be convicted of one of four crimes: attempt to attempt,
attempt to conspire, conspiracy to attempt, or conspiracy to conspire.124 These
"double inchoate" offenses remove the actor even further from the substantive
act.121 Such construction is logically absurd, reeks of due process violations,
and is simply unnecessary. 126
It does not stop there. That final drug act could include, possibly, a
transactional or distribution crime. 27 Almost by definition, such a crime
satisfies the requirements of conspiracy. 128 Tack one more crime onto the rap
sheet: Conspiracy to commit § 963, which includes conspiracy to commit
§ 960a, which includes a conspiratorial distribution crime. Some courts seem
to have trouble with multiple-inchoate offense convictions, although a circuit
split exists. 129 How far down this line can the prosecutor go before it becomes
123. Confusing? The courts think so. For a look at how the circuits have viewed this
issue, see infra note 129.
124. See Robbins, supra note 118, at 5-6 (introducing the double inchoate offenses as
"attempts to attempt, attempts to conspire, attempts to solicit, conspiracies to attempt,
conspiracies to conspire, conspiracies to solicit, solicitations to attempt, solicitations to
conspire, and solicitations to solicit").
125. See id. at 72 ("In their functions as inchoate crimes, both conspiracy and solicitation
are offenses that punish acts further removed from the completed offense than attempt does.").
126. See id. at 62-84 (criticizing double inchoate crimes). Robbins condemns multiple-
inchoate crimes for being logically absurd, precluding notice to offenders, and being unduly
cumbersome. Id.
127. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally.., to ... distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to... distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance .... ).
128. See United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1327 (8th Cir. 1995) ("If... the
buyer ... purchases drugs from the seller as part of a continuing buyer/seller relationship, he or
she may be... a co-conspirator with the seller in a drug distribution conspiracy.").
129. Compare United States v. Murrell, No. 79-5368, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13625, at *4
(6th Cir. 1980) ("There is no such thing as an 'attempt to conspire."'), and United States v.
Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980) (calling certain double inchoate offenses
"inane"), with United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1074 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming a
"conspiracy to attempt" conviction by finding that "the Government's charge contains all
elements necessary to prosecute a conspiracy: [A] provision making the act of conspiring a
crime and a provision making the object of the conspiracy a crime"), and United States v.
Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 710 (7th Cir. 1974) (affirming a "conspiracy to attempt" bank robbery
conviction by finding that "[w]hile entering the savings and loan was obviously an objective of
the conspiracy and a federal crime, the men necessarily contemplated their attempting to gain
entry into the building, and such attempts are expressly proscribed by [federal statute]"). In
Meacham the Fifth Circuit reasoned:
[Ilt would be the height of absurdity to conspire to commit an attempt, an inchoate
offense, and simultaneously conspire to fail at the effort. It would be even more
inane to commit the other crime the government would have us recognize-attempt
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unconstitutional? 13
0
A. RICO Provides an Analogy
Helpful to the prediction of the multiple-inchoate implications of§ 960a is
an analogy to statutes with more established history. Especially infamous for
their double inchoate problems are Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) laws.' 3' RICO laws "make[] it a crime to conspire to
to conspire. A scenario leading to a prosecution for that offense might read
something like this: A suggests to B that they get together to discuss the possibility
of violating the criminal code and to select the provisions they will violate. B
agrees to meet and talk. While ascending the staircase leading into the room in
which they will meet, both slip and fall down the stairs. A dies of his injuries. B,
who survives, is prosecuted for an attempt to conspire. The propriety of applying
conspiracy statutes "through" attempt statutes is not before us in this case. We note
the possibilities such an application could cause merely to highlight our belief that,
had Congress intended that there be prosecutions for conspiracies to attempt to
violate the drug laws, it would have so provided in terms less ambiguous than those
found in [§§ 846 and 963]. Congress is as much aware as we are of the venerable
maxim that penal statutes are to be strictly construed.
Meacham, 626 F.2d at 509 n.7. Likewise, the court held that "[§§ 846 and 963] do not
authorize conspiracy-to-attempt prosecutions." Id. at 509. The court in Meacham did not rule
on the question of "whether the government may prosecute the conceptually bizarre crime of
conspiracy to attempt in instances where separate provisions make both the conspiracy and the
attempt criminal offenses." Id. (emphasis added).
130. The Fifth Circuit called statutes like §§ 846 and 943 "unclear." See Meacham, 626
F.2d at 509 ("[The government] did not use a single statute as unclear as [§§ 846 and 963] to
prosecute a conspiracy to attempt."). This lack of clarity (as applied) suggests that the statute
could be unconstitutional. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (finding
an ordinance improperly vague because "'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning"' (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,391 (1926))). The Supreme
Court held that "the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties" and called this standard "a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with
ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law." Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
Ultimately, such a vague statute "violates the first essential of due process of law." Id. The
"void-for vagueness" doctrine is couched in terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment for federal statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment for state actions. See United
States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("The due-process clause of the [F]ifth
[A]mendment requires that a statute be declared void if it is so vague that 'men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."' (quoting
Connally, 269 U.S. at 391)); State v. Reed, 618 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 2000) ("Under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... , 'the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires
that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement."' (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983))).
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining "racketeering activity"). An interesting but
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engage in racketeering activity, and 'racketeering activity[]' in turn includes
conspiracies to engage in a number of wrongful acts." 132 However, the courts
have been reluctant to reverse RICO-based convictions on multiple-inchoate
bases. 133 Yet, the construction of these statutes seems to violate the void-for-
vagueness test articulated by the federal courts. 34 Why do courts treat them
differently? One explanation might come from the practice of only analyzing
the statutes as they were applied in the actual case, as opposed to how they
could have been applied. 135 That is, even if the courts would agree that it is
possible to construe these statutes in a manner that violates due process
protections, the actual application of the laws in prosecutions that have come
before the courts has not violated such protections.1
36
unimportant connection for purposes of this Note: "[§ 960a(a)(4)] designates the new offense a
federal crime of terrorism... thus making it among other things a RICO and money laundering
predicate offense." Charles Doyle, Criminal Money Laundering Legislation in the 109th
Congress, CRS REPORT RS22400, at 3 (Mar. 15, 2006).
132. Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Several Problems in Criminal Conspiracy Laws and Some
Proposals for Reform, 43 CRlM. L. BULL. 427, 459 (2007).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913,923 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that "a
RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), supported by predicate acts of racketeering
activity that in themselves are conspiracies," is punishable), abrogated on other grounds by
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170
n.15 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that "RICO itself has consistently withstood constitutional
challenges as void for vagueness"). In Zemek, the defendant argued that "a conspiracy to
obstruct state gambling laws.., is not properly chargeable as a predicate crime of a RICO
conspiracy" and "inclusion thereof creates a 'conspiracy to conspire' which is void for
vagueness." Id. The court disagreed with this reasoning because "[tihe essence of a RICO
conspiracy is not an agreement to commit predicate crimes but an agreement to conduct or
participate in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering." Id.
134. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251-56 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the vagueness of RICO statutes and the Court's interpretations of them);
see also Rosenberg, supra note 132, at 459 (calling RICO "maddeningly vague").
135. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 304 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("This Court has not applied, and, I venture to predict, will not apply, to federal statutes the
standard that they are unconstitutional if it is possible that they may be unconstitutionally
applied."); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation."). But see, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) ("In a facial challenge to the
overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct."); Young v. Mun. Court, 94
Cal. Rptr. 331,334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) ("Where an enactment is attacked on First Amendment
grounds, the court is not limited to examination of the application involved in the particular
case, but may consider all possible applications of the statute.").
136. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 473 (1974) ("[T]he mere possibility of
erroneous application of the statute does not amount 'to the irreparable injury necessary to
justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings."' (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
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This distinction begs the question of what the future will hold for § 960a
prosecutions. The case must first come to the court in the form of an individual
who challenges the vague laws himself,37 who is charged expressly in a
multiple-inchoate fashion,1 38 and who challenges the law as applied in his
particular case.1 39 The § 960a cases that have evolved thus far have not posed
this question to the courts. 40 It is likely that such a challenge would fail, if for
no other reason than the fact that the courts tend to punish drug crimes
harshly.' 4' Additionally, the importance of successfully prosecuting narco-
terrorism is such that courts will probably be hesitant to find a grand jury's
indictment faulty based only on their chosen method of construing the
statutes.142 The courts may find some sort of "seriousness exception.'
43
479, 485 (1965))).
137. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (1982) ("'[V]agueness challenges to statutes
which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of
the case at hand."' (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975))).
138. See United States v. Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 167,184 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[D]efendant
is not being charged with a conspiracy to conspire or a conspiracy to prepare to conspire but
only with providing support to an existing conspiracy."). In Awan, the court differentiated
between the defendant's material support of a conspiracy and his membership in that
conspiracy. Id. The court reasoned that "[t]he defendant is not being charged with being a
member of the conspiracy to murder, kidnap or maim. He is simply alleged to have completed
the offense of conspiring to and actually providing material support to carry out such a
conspiracy." Id.
139. See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1170 n.15 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Absent
development of authority and some relation to the facts of this case, we decline to hypothesize
constitutional defects."); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the
difference between facial and as-applied challenges).
140. For a discussion on the case law associated with § 960a, see supra Parts II.B.1-4.
141. See Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and
Population Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 63, 71-72 (1999) (describing the change toward more
intense drug punishments as a result of political pressure).
142. In the circuits that have upheld multiple-inchoate constructions, see supra note 129,
the crimes were arguably less severe than those implicated by § 960a. One case involved
dealing and exporting firearms without a license, United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067,
1074 (2d Cir. 1981), and the other involved bank robbery, United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700,
710 (7th Cir. 1974).
143. Applying this concept to multiple-inchoate crimes was first introduced by Thurman
Arnold in 1930. See Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an
Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 65 (1930) (discussing the idea that a court may choose to punish
serious inchoate crimes, but not less-serious crimes).
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B. Public Policy Determines the Proper Result
In addition to double (or triple) inchoate crimes being "logically absurd,"
they appear to be violative of public policy.' 44 This is another reason why
§ 960a, as drafted, reflects Congress's imprecise and improper construction.
Society demands conspiracy laws for a number of reasons. When people join
together with a common scheme in crime, they are regarded as more dangerous
than one individual acting in that capacity. 145 Additionally, the agreement to
commit a crime demonstrates the criminals' dangerousness and the "firmness of
their criminal intentions."' 46 This is because "to unite, back of a criminal
purpose, the strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more
dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer."'
147
Furthermore, "[c]oncerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal
object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the
144. See Robbins, supra note 118, at 62-84 (criticizing double inchoate crimes). Robbins
chronicles the courts' rationalizations for not being receptive of double-inchoate prosecutions.
Id. The focus is on the "logical absurdity" and legislative intent analyses instead of true public
policy arguments. Id. at 85; see also United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509 (5th Cir.
1980) (calling double inchoate offenses "conceptually bizarre"); Arnold, supra note 143, at 62
("One way of treating cases arising under [criminal attempt] statutes is to determine whether the
policy of the statute can be said to include the conduct of the defendant and whether the penalty
seems appropriate to the offense."); supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing
Meacham in more detail).
145. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770,778 (1975) (recognizing that "conspiracy
poses distinct dangers quite apart from those of the substantive offense"). The Court stated:
This settled principle derives from the reason of things in dealing with socially
reprehensible conduct: [C]ollective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-
presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted
action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully
attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from
their path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not
normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which
one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited
to the particular end toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes
more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which
the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not
confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.
Id. (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961)). In fact, the Supreme
Court found that "conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and so punishable in
itself." Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997).
146. See JOsHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 29.02 (4th ed. 2006)
(providing an overview of the policy considerations behind conspiracy laws); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 387-88 (focusing on American Law Institute's purposes for including
conspiracy laws in the Model Penal Code).
147. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.' 48 Finally,
concerted activity permits more cQmplex crimes, and the likelihood of
additional crimes being attempted and executed increases.
149
However, the further an actor is removed from the substantive crime-that
is, from creating the actual harm-the less important it is to criminalize those
acts. 150 Permitting courts to punish acts "further removed from a completed
offense" would give them "unlimited discretion. 'l 1 It would also "render
illegal acts which, in themselves, are insufficient even to constitute an
anticipatory crime. Thus it would forbid conduct which is not unlawful."
152
The Ninth Circuit called indicting in this fashion a "poor practice."'1
5 3
Furthermore, the construction of multiple statutes in this manner appears to
contradict the intent of the legislature. 54  Most importantly, however,
permitting such strange constructions would not give notice to potential
offenders-a requirement to be consitutional.'55
In summary, although no grand jury has indicted anybody in a multiple-
inchoate fashion under § 960a, the potential exists. Congress drafted the
statutes with the inchoate language included, and "Congress is as much aware
as [the courts] are of the venerable maxim that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed.' 56 This, in addition to the absent drug-terror nexus, is a hallmark of
a sloppy legislature, the consequence of which could be more people
prosecuted than Congress anticipated.
148. Callanan, 364 U.S. at 593.
149. See id. at 593-94 (enumerating the various justifications for punishing inchoate
offenses).
150. See Rosenberg, supra note 132, at 460 ("[T]here is... a terrible danger... that a
defendant may be convicted of this charge even though the jury has not thoroughly understood
it.... All of the reasons that argue against the criminalization of conspiracy apply with even
greater force to conspiracies-to-conspire.").
151. Robbins, supra note 118, at 64.
152. People v. Schwimmer, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
153. United States v. Dearmore, 672 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1982).
154. See Robbins, supra note 118, at 62 ("[S]ome recent decisions declining to recognize
double inchoate offenses have referred to the absence of express legislative intent to allow
courts the essentially common-law authority to create crimes by combining statutory inchoate
offenses.").
155. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (invalidating a
municipal vagrancy ordinance as "void for vagueness," and requiring an ordinance to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the statute forbade his contemplated behavior).
156. United States v. Meachan, 626 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980).
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V. Hypothetical Situations with a Less Forgiving Prosecutor
The cases that have arisen under § 960a thus far have not addressed the
nexus and conspiracy issues that this Note has raised. 157 The reasons for this
are speculative, 58 but immaterial for the future. The fact remains that the text
contains these flaws, and an unreasonable, incautious, or politically motivated
prosecutor could use the statute in a way unintended by Congress.1 59 This Part
suggests four hypothetical situations to gauge the breadth of a prosecutor's
discretion under the text Congress approved. 160  These hypotheticals
demonstrate the broad reach that this statute implicates. They demonstrate that
§ 960a, used properly, can serve effectively the goals of Congress. They also
demonstrate that, used improperly, the statute can have an unjustly devastating
effect on even non-narco-terrorists.
A. Terrorist Selling Drugs to Support Terror
The Sendero Luminoso (or "Shining Path") is the Communist Party of Peru
and is a U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization. 161 A leader in this organization, M, regularly ambushes
Peruvian police officers and attempts to assassinate high-ranking city
officials in an effort to support cultural revolution.162 M has a smallguerilla army that is directly involved in the production, sale, and
157. See supra notes 26-57 and accompanying text (reviewing the cases that have arisen
under § 960a).
158. For a short list of possible reasons, see supra Part III.A.
159. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 18 ("While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most
beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of
the worst.").
160. Hypotheticals have helped develop Supreme Court precedent in the past. See, e.g.,
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 594 n. 1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(proposing a hypothetical situation to illuminate the consequential effects of the majority's
decision).
161. See Public Notice for Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg.
51,090 (Oct. 5, 2001) (listing alternate names for Shining Path as Sendero Luminoso and
Communist Party of Peru); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 40 (listing the Shining
Path as a Foreign Terrorist Organization).
162. The statute defines "terrorist activity" by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(B). See
21 U.S.C. § 960a (2006) (criminalizing narco-terrorism). This includes attempted
assassinations. See 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV) (2006) (listing "assassination[s]" as a form
of terrorist activity). The statute defines "terrorism" by reference to 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2).
See 21 U.S.C. § 960a (2006) (criminalizing narco-terrorism). "[T]he term 'terrorism' means
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents." 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006).
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transportation of cocaine to fund its terrorist activities. At all times, M is
using cocaine sales to fund his terrorist organization so that its goals may
be achieved.
This is the individual Congress is targeting with § 960a.163 The fact
pattern closely resembles the cases currently pending before the United States
federal courts.164 The drug-terror nexus is very evident, and a prosecutor could
reasonably charge Mwith violating § 960a without mention of any conspiracy
laws.
B. Drug Dealer Using Terror to Support Drug Crimes
Nis a large-scale drug dealer in Washington, D.C. He supports himself and
his family from the sale of cocaine and heroin. He only deals in very large
quantities, often truckloads, of the drugs. He hires bodyguards who are
well armed and who protect him at all times. N receives information that
the DEA is about to set up a sting operation to finally catch him. To "send
a message" to the DEA, N has a friend hijack a DEA vehicle, place
explosives in the trunk, and roll the vehicle into a DEA office, killing
several agents.
165
This is the second kind of narco-terrorism suggested by Senator Comyn
when he originally introduced the bill to the Senate.' 66  Senator Comyn
specifically stated that "actual drug traffickers who use terrorism against
civilians to advance their agenda" should be targeted. 67 This marked the move
away from the traditional narco-terror model: A terrorist who used the
163. See Narco-Terrorism Enforcement Act of 2005, 151 CONG. REc. E1073 (daily ed.
May 24, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("This bill makes clear that.., if these drugs help
support or sustain a foreign terrorist organization, the producers and traffickers can, and should
be, prosecuted for material support of terrorism....").
164. See, e.g., supra Parts II.B.1-4 (summarizing the current case law).
165. Both hijacking and the use of explosives are considered "terrorist activity." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), (V)(b) (2006). Soliciting another to commit the terrorism also qualifies
as engaging in terrorism. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V). Unfortunately, this hypothetical is not far
removed from reality. In 2004, drug dealers firebombed Edna McAbier's Baltimore home after
she called the police about their illegal activities. Honoring the Brave Warriors Who Have
Enlisted in the Fight Against Narco-Terrorism, 152 CONG. REc. El800 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
2006) (statement of Rep. Cummings). Similarly, in 2002, Angela Dawson and her five children
were killed in their Baltimore home when drug dealers filled the home with gasoline and set it
on fire. Id. This was after Dawson "fought to get [the] drug dealers off her street, and away
from her five young children." Id.
166. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (identifying the targets of the bill).
167. 151 CONG. REc. S9846 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Comyn).
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proceeds from drugs to support his cause. 68 The drug-terror connection is
somewhat less direct in this case. Here, N is using terror to scare away drug
enforcement agents so that he can continue dealing drugs. Yet, N could not
have been convicted under the original text of the statute. 169 The original bill
required that the criminal must commit a drug crime knowing that such activity
would support terrorism.170 Here, the focus is on the terrorism supporting the
drug crimes. Clearly such a distinction did not matter to Senator Cornyn.
When he introduced the bill to the Senate, it still contained the "that such
activity" language necessitating a nexus.171 When Congress removed the nexus
from the statute, it appears they were attempting to make prosecutions such as
N" s more legitimate.
C. Casual User Supports Terrorism
Twenty-two-year-old K is a recent college graduate with lofty public
servant aspirations. He holds a steady job working for the local
government. As is standard procedure for individuals working in his
capacity, K has undergone-and passed-many drug tests over the course
of his career. During a fraternity reunion, K is photographed at a party
smoking marijuana. There is also a short video of him distributing
marijuana to his friends. As the investigation into K's background evolves,
officials learn that K is also an avid supporter of the Animal Liberation
Front (ALF)--an "extremist animal rights movement that has carried out
numerous terrorist attacks in the United States since 1987." 172 To support
ALF, K sends two checks for $500 to the organization each year. The
money directly supports-and K knows this-terrorist activities.
According to 21 U.S.C. § 960a, K is a narco-terrorist. He engaged in a
crime that violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)--distribution of a controlled
substance-and knowingly contributed to the pecuniary support of terrorism.
Is this the individual that Congress was targeting with § 960a? Every
discussion on the floor of the House and Senate suggests the opposite
168. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the shift from the traditional
narco-terrorism model to include drug traffickers who employ terrorism to achieve their cause).
169. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing text of the original bill).
170. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing text of the original bill).
171. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing text of Senate bill). For more
discussion on the "that such activity" language, see supra Part III.C.
172. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI PuB. No. 0308, TERRoRIsM: 2000/2001, at 2
(2004).
1913
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1881 (2009)
conclusion. 173 This possibility was even discussed: "This might, unfortunately,
bring in some small-time dealer that did not know what he was doing and all of
a sudden he is subjected to 20-year mandatory minimums when he was not
much of a dealer at all.'
' 74
No popular definition of"narco-terrorist" supports this idea, either. 75 Yet,
Congress has given prosecutors, those with "more control over life, liberty, and
reputation than any other person in America," the tool to double K's
sentence. 76 This is the sort of unreasonable result that can occur because
Congress erred in drafting the text of § 960a. This is not to say that K should
not be prosecuted. On the contrary, "[i]f anyone is engaged in drug trafficking
of any significance in order to support terrorism, they can already be charged
with both a drug offense and the material support of terrorism.
1 77
D. Multiple-Inchoate Terrorist
A is a terrorist. He is running low on funds for his terrorist operation. He
thinks that a good way to raise money is to manufacture methamphetamine
and sell it, but he does not know how to make it. A contacts his friend B,
who A understands is knowledgeable in ways of cooking meth. A explains
to B, "I am considering moving from 'terrorist' to 'narco-terrorist,' but I
have not decided to do so yet. I want to discuss this possibility with you."
Agreeing to nothing else, A and B agree to meet to discuss possibly
violating § 960a.
A knows he will need a purchaser for this meth once it is made. He calls a
fellow terrorist with more capital, C. The well-funded C agrees with A to
meet with A and B, excited at the possibility of meeting and agreeing to
purchase a large amount of methamphetamine, which C will then distribute
to support his terrorist operations. C writes about this excitement in his
diary.
On the way to the meeting, government agents apprehend all three of the
individuals.
173. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the legislative history.
174. 151 CONG. REC. H6293 (daily ed. July 21, 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott). At the
time Representative Scott made this statement, the bill's text included a twenty-year mandatory
minimum sentence, a provision that was later removed. See 151 CONG. REc. H6292 (daily ed.
July 21, 2005) (reprinting the text of the statute).
175. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the textual history of narco-terrorism.
176. Jackson, supra note 9, at 18.
177. 151 CONG. REc. H6293 (daily ed. July 21, 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott).
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In addition to § 960a, C is charged with violating § 963: Conspiracy to
commit § 960a.178 The evidence of the § 960a crime is his diary, which
describes the anticipated conspiracy of narco-terrorism. The substantive
drug crime was possession with intent to distribute. Thus, C was
attempting to conspire to possess with the intent to distribute a controlled
substance, intending to financially support terrorist activity.' 
79
This Note mentions this hypothetical "merely to highlight [the] belief that,
had Congress intended that there be prosecutions for conspiracies to attempt to
violate the drug laws, it would have so provided in terms less ambiguous than
those found in [§§ 846 and 963]. "18° Indeed, "Congress is as much aware as we
are of the venerable maxim that penal statutes are to be strictly construed,"'81 a
rule "perhaps not much less old than construction itself., 182 After all, "[i]t is the
legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment."' 
83
Yet, such a construction is feasible. This represents the sort of triple-
inchoate crime issue that infrequently-though importantly-arises in this
context. An attempt to conspire to possess with intent to distribute removes the
individual far from the culpability of dangerous activity.184 An individual
prosecuted in this manner is not the person that Congress intended to punish.
For this reason alone, the statute should be redrafted to focus on the aims of the
legislature and eliminate the possibility of overzealous prosecutions of non-
narco-terrorists.
VI. Recommendations to Congress for a Proper Statute
"Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to
remain unaltered."'185  Congress should take a proactive step and redraft
178. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing how § 963 includes conspiracy
or attempt of the actions proscribed by § 960a).
179. This hypothetical is very loosely based on one offered by former Fifth Circuit Judge
Henry Politz. For the text of his hypothetical, see supra note 129.
180. United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980).
181. Id.
182. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
183. Id.
184. See DRESSLER, supra note 146, at 475 n. 112 ("Some courts... may be troubled on
policy grounds about recognizing such a highly inchoate offense: A conspiracy can occur far
sooner than an attempt; an attempted conspiracy, therefore, takes the process to an even earlier
stage.").
185. ARIsTOTLE, THE PoLmcs 39 (Stephen Everson ed., Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
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narrowly the text of § 960a to reflect its original aims. Targeting true narco-
terrorism is a legitimate function of Congress. Allowing prosecutors to do so in
a multiple-inchoate fashion, or without a drug-terror nexus, is not. "Altering
the important provisions of a statute is a legislative function, ' 86 not a function
of the courts.
This Note offers a new 21 U.S.C. § 960a. Though much of the language
is borrowed from the current text, it has been altered to reflect a more carefully
considered law that provides prosecutors adequate discretion while still
protecting the liberties of non-narco-terrorists. The result is an improved,
clearer statute that achieves the aims of Congress better than the current law.
A. The Text of the New 21 U.S.C. § 960a
21 U.S.C. § 960a
(a) Prohibited Acts
Whoever violates § 841(a) of this title, knowing or intending that such
activity provides anything of pecuniary value to a person or organization
that engages in terrorist activity, shall be punishable under this section.
(b) Punishment
A person violating subsection (a) shall be sentenced to: 1) a term of
imprisonment of not less than twice the minimum punishment otherwise
required by § 841(b)(1) of this title, and not more than life; 2) a fine in
accordance with the provisions of Title 18; or 3) both.
Any sentence imposed under this subsection shall include a term of
supervised release of at least 5 years in addition to such term of
imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3583 notwithstanding.
(c) Proof requirements
To violate subsection (a), a person must have knowledge that the person or
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity.
(d) Definitions




"Terrorist activity" is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(B).
"Anything of pecuniary value" is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b)(1).
(e) Jurisdiction
There is jurisdiction over an offense under this section if:
(1) the prohibited drug activity or the terrorist offense occurs in or affects
interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) an offender provides anything of pecuniary value for a terrorist offense
that causes or is designed to cause 1) death or serious bodily injury to a
national of the United States while that national is outside the United
States, or 2) substantial damage to the property of a legal entity organized
under the laws of the United States (including any of its States, districts,
commonwealths, territories, or possessions) while that property is outside
of the United States;
(3) the prohibited drug activity occurs in whole or in part outside of the
United States (including on the high seas), and a perpetrator of the offense
or the prohibited drug activity is a national of the United States or a legal
entity organized under the laws of the United States (including any of its
States, districts, commonwealths, territories, or possessions); or
(4) after the conduct required for the offense occurs, an offender is brought
into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the
offense occurs outside the United States.
B. The Rationale for the New Text
There are two primary differences between the current and the proposed
§ 960a. First, the original drug-terror nexus language "that such activity" has
been revived to insist that the nexus is inherent in narco-terrorism.1 87 Second,
the proposal eliminates reference to conspiracy and attempt to help reduce the
impulse of prosecutors to establish a multiple-inchoate construction against a
minimally culpable individual.188 A number of other changes have been made.
187. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text for a discussion on the phrase "that
such activity."
188. See supra Part IV for a discussion on the problem with multiple-inchoate crimes.
Section 963, which criminalizes conspiracy and attempt of§ 960a, should remain the same. See
21 U.S.C. § 963 (2006) ("Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined
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Clarity being a hallmark of a well-drafted statute, the proposal has attempted to
remove the clutter of parentheticals from the text.' 89 The proposal removed
superfluous language and numbered provisions in the statute to guide the reader
to the intent of the legislature. The result is a clear statute that effects the
purpose of Congress with greater economy than the current § 960a.
Applying this new statute to the hypotheticals presented in Part V above,
the practical differences become apparent. Under the proposed § 960a, M, the
member of the Shining Path who produces cocaine and terrorizes government
officials, would still be convicted.' 90 Such an actor being Congress's most
obvious target, the statute achieves its primary aim. The Washington, D.C.
drug dealer who terrorizes the DEA, N, would not be prosecuted under this
statute.' 91 It requires that the drug crime provide pecuniary support for the
terrorism, not the other way around. Although N deserves to be punished,
"[d]rug trafficking and terrorism crimes already carry numerous penalties for
the most egregious offenses, so we do not need them anew in this case."'
192
Simply put, there is already a remedy for this wrong.
The casual drug-using public servant, K, is not subject to the new
§ 960a. 193 There is no nexus between his drug crime and his terrorism support.
Both are punishable by law, but Congress does not mean to double his sentence
for being a narco-terrorist. By requiring the nexus, K properly may be
prosecuted without improperly being labeled a narco-terrorist. Finally, the
triple-inchoate liable C likewise would be safe from prosecution under this
statute. 194 Multiple-inchoate liability crimes are logically absurd and violative
of public policy. 95 The new version of the statute narrows the possible scope
in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."). Indeed, this Note does not
advocate the abolition of all conspiracy laws. "We need to have conspiracy clauses that enable
us, as [terrorists] start to interconnect from South America, Asia and the Middle Eastern gangs
as they swap cocaine for other things and convert and move in the underground market. We
need to stay up with how the terrorists are working." 151 CONG. REc. H6293 (daily ed. July 21,
2005) (statement of Rep. Souder).
189. There is an "interest in requiring the Congress to draft its legislation with greater
clarity or precision." United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 45 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
190. For the hypothetical discussed here, see supra Part V.A.
191. For the hypothetical discussed here, see supra Part V.B.
192. 151 CONG. REc. H6293 (daily ed. July 21, 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott).
193. For the hypothetical discussed here, see supra Part V.C.
194. For the hypothetical discussed here, see supra Part V.D.
195. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (criticizing multiple-inchoate criminal




of prosecution to disallow prosecutors from targeting the less culpable who do
not fit the definition of "narco-terrorists."
VII. Conclusion
Narco-terrorism is a dangerous problem both at home and abroad. 196 It
will take many years to combat and there is no single remedy for the issue.'
97
Yet, government leaders from both sides of the aisle agree that something must
be done.198 One response was enacting 21 U.S.C. § 960a.' 99 So far, it has
proven to be an effective tool for combating narco-terrorism. 200 However, the
possibility remains that it could be used in a manner inconsistent with the
original aims of Congress. Robert Jackson warned of zealous prosecutors who
seek victims and serve factional purposes.2 °1 Supplied with the current text of
§ 960a, such a prosecutor could cast the narco-terrorism net over an individual
whom Congress did not intend to be prosecuted in this manner.20 2 Although
this has not occurred yet, "[n]o one will deny that wrong statutes can be and are
enforced., 20 3 As presently written, § 960a is a "wrong statute." First, it allows
196. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 599-604 (describing the history and effects of narco-
terrorism in America and around the world).
197. See Braun, supra note 2, at 28 ("[T]he Defense Department estimates that the war on
terror could last for another thirty to fifty years."); Marshall, supra note 18, at 604 ("Law
enforcement alone is not the answer to the problems of drugs or terror. Aggressive coordinated
programs of public awareness, education, prevention, civic action, corporate involvement, along
with aggressive use of law enforcement and the criminal justice system are essential.... ").
198. See Obama's Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES.COM, July 15, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html?pagewanted=all (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009) (quoting Democrat Barack Obama as saying, "We cannot lose Afghanistan to a
future of narco-terrorism") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ramon
Bracamontes, U.S. Pays Millions to Help Mexico Fight Vicious Cartels, EL PASO TIEs, Feb. 7,
2009, http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci1 1655818 (last visited Oct. 6,2009) (reporting that
Republican Senator Comyn "supports assisting the Mexican government in fighting narco-
terrorism due to its serious implications for our national security") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
199. See 151 CONG. REC. H6292 (daily ed. July 21, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("My
amendment creates a new crime that will address and punish those who would use.., illicit
narcotics to promote and support terrorism."); id at H6293 (statement of Rep. Lungren) (stating
that narco-terrorism "is a serious crime and one that needs to be stopped, and this amendment
would do the job").
200. In 2008, Khan Mohammed was the first person to be convicted under the statute. For
further discussion about his case, see supra Part II.B.3.
201. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 20.
202. For an example of how this could happen, see the hypothetical suggested supra Part
V.C.
203. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 460 (1897).
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for the severe punishment-double the sentence for the drug crime--of an
individual whose alleged "narco-terror" did not contain a drug-terror nexus, as
the case, textual, and statutory histories all indicate is required. 204 Second, it
allows a creative prosecutor to arrange an indictment in a multiple-inchoate
crime fashion, a construction that troubles courts and academics alike.205 Both
of these problems present the possibility of prosecutions inconsistent with
congressional intent.
The remedy for this problem is redrafting the statute. Such legislation
should be clear, precise, and-most importantly-include a drug-terror nexus
requirement and remove inchoate-crime references. "Only by extreme care can
we protect the spirit as well as the letter of our civil liberties .... Section
960a is the result of Congress's failure to exercise such extreme care. Congress
now has the duty to act swiftly to redraft the statute so it may better reflect the
real aims of laws against narco-terrorism: Punishing those who most deserve
it 207it.
2°
204. For a discussion on the drug-terror nexus requirement, see supra Part III.
205. See generally supra Part IV (considering the legitimacy of multiple-inchoate crimes in
the narco-terrorism context).
206. Jackson, supra note 9, at 20.
207. Memorandum from U.S. Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft to all Federal Prosecutors (Sept.
22, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm ("It is the policy of the
Department of Justice that, in all federal criminal cases, federal prosecutors must charge and
pursue the most serious ... offenses . ").
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